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Abstract
The legal profession has historically asserted moral and legal authority
to substantially control the speech of judges and lawyers. This impulse to
control the speech of judges and lawyers is driven by many of the
profession’s most strongly held interests and values. These include such
interests as ensuring the fair administration of justice, the promotion of
respect for the rule of law, the preservation of public confidence in the
legal system, the preservation of the appearance of judicial impartiality, the
maintenance of professionalism, and the safeguarding of the dignity of the
profession. Some of these interests are palpable and may directly buttress
the functionality of the legal system. These functional interests include
regulations that directly affect the operation of the legal system, such as
regulations that are calculated to deter actual interference with the
administration of justice, to preserve the lawyer’s obligations to maintain
client confidences, or to prevent misleading lawyer advertising or
marketing. Other interests often advanced to defend restrictions on the
speech of judges and lawyers, however, are grounded in the highest ideals
and values of the profession, rather than the actual functionality of the legal
system. These include values such as promoting respect for the rule of law,
maintaining public confidence in the legal system, maintaining
professionalism (a concept different from adherence to hard-law legal
ethical rules), and safeguarding the dignity of the profession. This Essay
argues that the two types of rationales, functional and idealistic, are on
different footings under First Amendment theory and doctrine. Regulation
of the speech of judges and lawyers is appropriately treated as a “carve
out” from the high levels of protection afforded speech in the general
marketplace. Even so, this Essay maintains, once regulation moves from
the actual protection of functional interests to the aspirational values of the
profession, the First Amendment comes to bear with greater force, and
many regulations restricting the speech of judges and lawyers on more
ethereal grounds ought to be deemed inconsistent with the First
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Amendment. These values, of enormous importance to most judges,
lawyers, and legal educators, are best advanced through education and peer
pressure, and not outright regulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Woody Allen tells a story of being disciplined for cheating on a
metaphysics exam: He looked into the soul of the student sitting next to
him.1 This Essay looks into the soul of the legal profession and explores
how some of the profession’s most deeply cherished values, such as fairly
administering justice, promoting respect for the rule of law, preserving
public confidence in the legal system, preserving the appearance of judicial
impartiality, maintaining professionalism, and safeguarding the dignity of
the profession, may serve to justify restricting the free speech rights of
judges and lawyers.
The speech of judges and lawyers operating within the legal profession
1. ANNIE HALL (MGM 1977).
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is circumscribed to protect palpable functional interests, such as avoiding
actual interference with the administration of justice, preserving the
lawyer’s obligations to maintain client confidences, or preventing
misleading lawyer advertising or marketing. Where speech is limited for
these reasons, the case for reduced First Amendment protection for judges
and lawyers is theoretically coherent and practically straightforward.
Restricting the speech of judges and lawyers in such circumstances fits
comfortably within established First Amendment theory and doctrine.
When the basis for restricting speech drifts from such palpably
functional rationales and ranges into the more idealistic and mythological
values of the profession, the First Amendment justifications for such
regulation become much less coherent and far more complicated. Values
such as promoting respect for the rule of law, maintaining public
confidence in the legal system, maintaining professionalism (a concept
different than adherence to hard-law legal ethical rules), and safeguarding
the dignity of the profession are aspirational. They are values embraced
with great pride by most judges, lawyers, legal educators, and law students.
But to what extent do First Amendment theory and doctrine permit these
values to serve as justifications for reducing the free speech protections
that judges and lawyers would otherwise enjoy as private citizens?
Exploring that question is the principal focus of this Essay.
I. DISTINGUISHING THE GOVERNMENT AS SOVEREIGN FROM THE
GOVERNMENT AS MANAGER
In considering the extent to which construction of the First Amendment
ought to permit the government to restrict the speech of judges, it is
critical, at the outset, to determine what capacity the government is acting
in. Is the government acting in its capacity as a sovereign, invoking its
police power to control expression in the general marketplace of ideas? Or
is it instead acting as “manager” of an enterprise constituting one of the
special settings that are appropriately treated as “carve outs” from the
marketplace? This determination is critical because the First Amendment
applies with substantially diminished force in these carve outs.
A. The High Protection for Speech in the Marketplace
Modern First Amendment law provides robust protection for freedom
of speech in the general marketplace. Content-based regulation of speech
in the general marketplace is subject to the rigorous demands of the “strict
scrutiny” test. The test requires that the law be “justified by a compelling
government interest and . . . narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”2
“Viewpoint discrimination,” in which the government targets not simply a
subject, but particular viewpoints advanced by speakers on that subject, is
2. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011).
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an especially egregious form of content discrimination.3 Viewpoint
discrimination is virtually always deemed invalid.4 A network of more
specific First Amendment doctrines in turn augments these general
prohibitions on content and viewpoint discrimination in the general
marketplace. This network creates additional layers of protection for
freedom of speech in specific pockets of First Amendment law, in which
special tests styled for specific problems have evolved. This accounts, for
instance, for the high levels of constitutional protection surrounding
defamation of public officials and public figures,5 and the tests for
incitement,6 threats,7 and obscenity.8 Under this regime of extraordinarily
high protection for freedom of speech in the general marketplace, myriad
forms of grossly graphic and highly offensive speech are deemed protected
by the First Amendment. These forms of speech include flag burning, cross
burning, graphic depictions of violence against animals, hateful picketing
of military funerals, and false claims of military honors.9
The restrictions commonly placed on the expressive rights of judges
and lawyers would thus almost certainly be struck down under the First
Amendment if the general marketplace rules were applied.10 The
restrictions on expression by judges and lawyers are invariably based on
content and viewpoint, and in addition often implicate other more specific
First Amendment doctrines protecting free speech. The question thus
3. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“When the
government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the
violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus an
egregious form of content discrimination.” (citation omitted)).
4. Id. at 828 (“Discrimination against speech because of its message is presumed to be
unconstitutional.”).
5. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334–35 (1974) (recognizing that the
actual malice standard extended to defamation of public figures); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that public officials may only recover for defamation if they
prove “actual malice” through clear and convincing evidence, requiring knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for truth or falsity).
6. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam) (distinguishing
incitement from mere advocacy, and creating a test that is essentially a restatement of the older
“clear and present danger” test requiring that the speech be directed to the incitement of imminent
lawless action and likely to produce that action before it may be rendered criminal).
7. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam) (distinguishing
between the rhetorical use of threatening language against the President incident to advocacy and a
true threat not protected by the First Amendment).
8. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 27 (1973) (holding that “patently offensive
‘hard core’” pornography is not protected by the First Amendment but establishing a demanding
three-part test for obscenity that was highly protective of sexually explicit speech).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (protecting false claims
of military honors); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (protecting hateful protests
directed at the funeral of a serviceman who died in Iraq); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577,
1592 (2010) (protecting violent and graphic depictions of animal cruelty); Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003) (protecting cross-burning when it does not constitute a true threat); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989) (protecting flag-burning as a symbol of protest).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 43–71.
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becomes whether the regulation of the speech of judges and lawyers,
incident to the government’s managerial regulation of the “legal
profession,” may appropriately be deemed a “carve out” in which
diminished First Amendment protections should apply.11
B. The Reduced Protection in the Carve Outs
First Amendment doctrine imposes less severe restraints on
governmental speech regulation when the government is acting as a direct
participant in an enterprise in which the regulation of speech is incident to
the government’s superintendence of that enterprise, rather than regulating
speech as a pandemic sovereign exercising its police power in the general
marketplace.12 These are best understood as carve outs from the general
marketplace, with the government managing the setting that comprises the
carve out. Classic examples of such carve outs where the government
regulates speech include the following: in its role as manager of public
employees,13 when it operates as educator,14 when it operates prisons,15
when it operates as military commander,16 when it regulates broadcasting
11. See infra text accompanying notes 43–71.
12. See, e.g., In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Sometimes, however, the
government acts in a capacity that goes beyond merely being sovereign, and it gains additional
authority to regulate speech in those capacities.”).
13. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (“We reject, however, the notion that
the First Amendment shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their
professional duties.”); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (“The limited First Amendment
interest involved here does not require that [the district attorney for Orleans Parish] tolerate action
which he reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy close
working relationships.”); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968) (determining that
the First Amendment does not protect statements directed toward a public official by a government
employee “when such statements are shown to have been made either with knowledge of their
falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity”).
14. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2007) (permitting school officials to
confiscate a student banner promoting illegal drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 275–76 (1988) (finding no First Amendment violation when a school principal deleted
two pages from a school-sponsored newspaper because the principal reasonably believed the
material “was [not] suitable for publication”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675,
685 (1986) (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to
permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic
educational mission.”). But see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514
(1969) (holding that the First Amendment does not permit school officials to deny students the right
to display their opposition to hostilities in Vietnam by wearing black bands of cloth on their
sleeves).
15. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989) (recognizing “the ‘inordinately
difficult undertaking’ that is modern prison administration” in considering First Amendment
protections in the prison context (citation omitted)).
16. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758–59 (1974) (“While the members of the military are
not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the
military community and of the military mission requires a different application of those
protections.”).
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to retain effective “ownership” of the scarce electromagnetic broadcast
spectrum,17 and when the government manages its own nonforum and
limited-forum property, facilities, and programs under the rubric of public
forum law.18
The First Amendment doctrines governing these carve outs are often
multilayered. One of the principal tasks is to determine whether the
regulation at issue is genuinely regulation “inside the carve out” or rather
an inappropriate effort to extend regulation into the general marketplace. A
threshold question in government employee speech cases, for example, is
whether the employee–claimant to First Amendment protection was
speaking in his or her capacity as an employee.19 If so, the employee–
claimant falls within the carve out and may not launch a First Amendment
claim.20 If not, that is, if the employee was speaking as a citizen on a matter
of public concern, the employee–claimant will at least qualify for a First
Amendment claim, which is then subject to a special balancing test to
weigh the interests of the employee–citizen against the interests of the
government as employer.21 Even within a carve out, the level of First
Amendment protection enjoyed by individuals within the “special setting”
may vary. In public school student speech cases, for example, the students
receive reduced, albeit still high protection, when they engage in passive
personal expression on school grounds in circumstances not connected to
any curricular or programmatic activity sponsored by the school. This was
the case for the famous black armband protest in Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.22 In contrast, when the expression
of the student arises from school-sponsored activities implicating the
pedagogical mission of the school, students may receive lower levels of
First Amendment protection.23
17. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386–90 (1969); id. at 388 (“Where there
are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is
idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every
individual to speak, write, or publish.”).
18. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725–26 (1990) (“The Government, even
when acting in its proprietary capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment
constraints, as does a private business, but its action is valid in these circumstances unless it is
unreasonable, or . . . arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (“In addition to time, place,
and manner regulations, the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”).
19. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (applying a standard that permitted school officials to restrict
speech in such circumstances only on a showing of substantial and material disruption).
23. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (employing a standard
lower than the Tinker test in a case involving censorship of material in a school-sponsored student
newspaper, permitting schools to regulate such expression merely on a showing that the regulation
is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss3/1

6

Smolla: Regulating the Speech of Judges and Lawyers: The First Amendment

2014]

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SOUL OF THE PROFESSION

967

II. THE “LEGAL PROFESSION” AS A SPECIAL SETTING CARVED
OUT OF THE GENERAL MARKETPLACE
The legal profession is appropriately treated as a carve out from the
First Amendment principles that apply in the general marketplace. In
articulating the contours of this carve out, it is important to distinguish
between the “insiders” and the “outsiders” to the system. It is also
important to distinguish between the rationales for regulating the speech of
insiders that bear directly on the functionality of the legal system, and
rationales grounded in idealism that express the aspirational values of the
profession, but do not directly affect functionality.
A. Distinguishing Outsiders from Insiders
Expression connected to the system of justice is quintessential “political
speech.” When the speaker is an outsider to the profession, such as a
citizen or journalist, the speaker receives the highest levels of First
Amendment protection. Even when the government seeks to restrain the
speech of journalists or citizens for reasons as compelling as preservation
of a fair criminal trial24 or avoidance of interference with the fair
administration of justice, First Amendment doctrine imposes highly
demanding standards. Such regulation is rarely upheld.25
Existing First Amendment doctrines, in contrast, have long recognized
that government may exert greater restraints on insiders.26 First
Amendment principles should be construed as treating the “Legal
Profession” as a special setting carved out from the general marketplace. In
this setting the expression of the two key classes of “insider” participants
in the profession—judges and lawyers—may be subject to greater
regulation than would otherwise be permitted in the general marketplace.

24. See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562, 569–70 (1976) (establishing a
demanding First Amendment test creating a near-absolute prohibition on “gag orders” restraining
journalists from reporting on events germane to criminal prosecutions arising from gruesome
murders in Nebraska).
25. See In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 825 (3d Cir. 2013).
In the realm of speech about ongoing judicial proceedings, the government’s
authority as sovereign provides only limited power to criminally punish speech by
those outside the judicial system. As the Supreme Court made clear in a trio of
cases involving members of the press held in criminal contempt for their news
stories, speech about ongoing judicial proceedings is criminally punishable only if
it poses a clear and present danger of obstructing or prejudicing the ongoing
proceedings.
Id. (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 372 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348
(1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260–63 (1941); and Standing Comm. on Discipline v.
Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995)).
26. See infra text accompanying notes 43–71.
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B. Defining the Contours of the “Legal Profession” Carve Out
The “legal profession” is a construct distinct from the “legal system.”
To the extent that the government’s management of the legal system entails
the management of the government employees who work within it, a carve
out already exists under the rubric of the special principles governing the
diminished free speech rights of government employees.27 As to members
of the legal system who work for the government, in short, no additional
analysis is required. Sometimes these government employees are, of
course, lawyers—as in the case of lawyers who become judges or
prosecutors, or who work for a state Attorney General’s Office, the
Department of Justice, or a myriad of other local, state, or federal agencies.
Indeed, the two most important Supreme Court decisions defining the
contours of the First Amendment standards applicable to government
employees were both cases involving prosecuting attorneys.28
The government also, however, may treat the legal profession as a carve
out, one that not only overlaps the legal system populated by government
lawyers but also extends well beyond it. In its capacity as manager of the
legal profession, government may extend its reach to nongovernmental
employees—the vast array of licensed practicing attorneys who do not
work for the government.
C. Functional Justifications for Reduced Free Speech
Protection for Judges and Lawyers
Existing First Amendment doctrine easily permits limitation of the
speech of judges and attorneys when the government proffers, to support
such regulation, convincing functional rationales manifestly directed to its
internal management of the legal system. When government seeks to
regulate the speech of attorneys inside a courtroom, as when a judge holds
a lawyer in contempt for obstructive or contumacious speech, the
Constitution plainly will not provide the same shelter that would exist for
the speech of the attorney in the general marketplace. In Sacher v. United
States, the Supreme Court sustained the power of courts to use their
contempt authority to sanction a lawyer for his expression within a
courtroom.29 The Court invoked solid functional rationales for its ruling,
noting that “[t]he nature of the [lawyer’s] deportment was not such as
merely to offend personal sensitivities of the judge, but it prejudiced the
expeditious, orderly and dispassionate conduct of the trial.”30
27. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154
(1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968).
28. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413; Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
29. 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952).
30. Id. at 5.
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When an attorney speaks outside the courtroom, however, the First
Amendment questions begin to become more complex. Should such
speech be deemed speech in the general marketplace and deserving of the
same high levels of protection that would attach to the speech of those
outside the legal system? Or is such speech appropriately deemed speech
by an internal participant, justifiably restricted for functional reasons?
The response of the legal profession itself is quite clear. The rule
commonly imposed in most states, and set forth in the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct is the same. It limits
the extrajudicial speech of a lawyer participating in an ongoing proceeding
when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the speech will
“have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding.” 31 This standard provides less First Amendment protection for
the participant–lawyer than it provides for citizens commenting on the
proceedings. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, the Supreme Court upheld
this standard.32 Chief Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the Court on
this issue, distinguished between parties to litigation and strangers to it. He
wrote that the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” standard struck
a “constitutionally permissible balance between the First Amendment
rights of attorneys in pending cases and the [government] interest in fair
trials.”33 Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized functional justifications for
the rule, as well as the rule’s viewpoint neutrality, and its limited temporal
impact, noting that the restriction only lasted while the proceeding was
ongoing.34
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.6(a) (2013) (“A lawyer who is participating or has
participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement
that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative
proceeding in the matter.”).
32. 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991). Gentile is somewhat complex in its technical holding
because the formal opinion of the Court was divided between the opinions of two Justices. Chief
Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court in a section joined by Justices White,
O’Connor, Scalia, and Souter, upholding the general “substantial likelihood of material prejudice”
standard. Id. (“We conclude that the ‘substantial likelihood of material prejudice’ standard applied
by Nevada and most other States satisfies the First Amendment.”). The Court nonetheless struck
down Nevada’s unusual interpretation and application of the rule, holding it was unconstitutionally
vague, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and O’Connor. Id. at 1048–49. Justice O’Connor thus provided the key swing vote, joining
the group that sustained the standard in general, but also joining the group that struck down
Nevada’s unique version of the standard.
33. Id. at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. Id. at 1076 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The regulation of attorneys’ speech is limited—it applies only to speech that is
substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points
of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it
merely postpones the attorneys’ comments until after the trial.
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The Gentile decision has impressive and articulate critics, including
Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, who lauds the great informational value to the
public of commentary by attorneys on pending cases.35 Dean Chemerinsky
makes the irrefutable point that such speech is plainly “political speech” of
the sort normally receiving the highest levels of First Amendment
protection.36 Dean Chemerinsky argues that the Gentile court should have
invoked the strict scrutiny test and struck down the Nevada rule.37 This
position is surely correct if we assume that the general marketplace
principles properly apply to an attorney’s extrajudicial speech. This Essay
argues, though, that Gentile is persuasive in treating a participating
attorney’s speech about a pending case as a carve out from the general
marketplace; at least to the extent that the attorney’s speech demonstrably
creates a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. An attorney is not
required to entirely check his or her First Amendment rights when entering
the courthouse door. By the same token, however, an attorney does not
entirely leave his or her professional responsibility to the tribunal behind
when exiting the courthouse door.
So too, restrictions on the expression of judges, beginning with
restrictions in the courtroom itself, ought not be deemed to face any potent
First Amendment objections when the regulations are grounded in such
functional rationales as the fair administration of justice. A solid example
is Rule 2.3(B) of the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial
Conduct:
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in
harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or
harassment based upon race, sex, gender, religion, national
origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital
status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall
not permit court staff, court officials, or others subject to the
judge’s direction and control to do so.38
As the commentary to the Rule makes clear, this ethical restriction
proscribes a wide range of expression, such as “slurs” and “epithets,”39 that
Id.
35. Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the First
Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 862–67 (1998).
36. Id. at 863.
37. See id. at 872–74.
38. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011).
39. Id. cmt. 2. The official commentary states:
Examples of manifestations of bias or prejudice include but are not limited to
epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping; attempted humor
based upon stereotypes; threatening, intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of
connections between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and irrelevant
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would plainly be protected by the expansive First Amendment protections
that exist in the general marketplace.40 Judges, of course, are government
employees, and fall under the government employee rule established in
Garcetti v. Ceballos. Under the rule, judges are not entitled to predicate a
First Amendment claim upon restrictions of speech if those restrictions
constitute “managerial discipline based on an employee’s expressions
made pursuant to official responsibilities.”41 Because of the nexus to the
government employee cases, regulation of statements made by judges
acting within the scope of their courtroom judicial duties usually presents
no serious First Amendment problems and is well justified by the
government’s powerful interests in managing the fair administration of
justice. When judges speak outside the contours of their job descriptions,
however, Garcetti’s terms do not apply, and government must resort to
nonfunctional justifications to buttress its effort at speech regulation.42
D. Nonfunctional Justifications for Speech Restrictions
The difficult First Amendment problems are triggered when
government regulations are grounded not in palpably functional rationales,
but in more ethereal values such as promoting respect for the rule of law,
maintaining professionalism and public confidence in the legal system, and
safeguarding the dignity of the profession. As might be expected, in such
cases the precedents are less consistent and the principles less clear. To
explore these rationales, this Essay looks at how the legal profession
struggles to apply First Amendment principles from both “negative” and
“positive” poles. The “negative pole” involves criticism of the system of
justice by lawyers and judges. Examples include when a lawyer writes or
says negative things about a sitting judge, or one sitting judge writes or
says negative things about another or about existing rules of law. The
“positive pole” involves self-promotion, as when a judicial candidate runs
for judicial office and attempts to garner votes for herself, or a lawyer
promotes himself in the marketplace for legal services to advance his
reputation and attract clients. In all of these cases the underlying speech,
judged by its content, would be presumptively protected under the First
Amendment if general marketplace rules applied. In the context of
references to personal characteristics. Even facial expressions and body language
can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding, jurors, the media, and others
an appearance of bias or prejudice. A judge must avoid conduct that may
reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.
Id.
40. See discussion supra Section I.B.
41. 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
42. Id. at 424 (“Employees who make public statements outside the course of performing
their official duties retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the kind
of activity engaged in by citizens who do not work for the government.”).
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government regulation of the legal profession, however, the outcomes and
animating principles often appear deeply confused.
1. Critique of the Legal System by Lawyers and Judges
As previously noted, critique of the legal system by outsiders to the
system enjoys the highest levels of First Amendment protection.43 When
insiders engage in such critique, however, “it ain’t necessarily so.”44 A
lawyer who criticizes a judge in the general marketplace, as opposed to
“going through the system” by invoking a state’s judicial disciplinary
apparatus, often does so at the lawyer’s own peril. A statement by the
Seventh Circuit captures this ethos:
Some judges are dishonest; their identification and removal is
a matter of high priority in order to promote a justified public
confidence in the judicial system. Indiscriminate accusations
of dishonesty, by contrast, do not help cleanse the judicial
system of miscreants yet do impair its functioning—for
judges do not take to the talk shows to defend themselves, and
few litigants can separate accurate from spurious claims of
judicial misconduct.45
Examples might be drawn from virtually any jurisdiction. A Florida
decision, In re Shimek,46 is nicely illustrative. A Florida attorney, Paul
Shimek, was defeated in a motion for summary judgment in a matter
pending before a Florida state trial judge, William Frye III, in the Circuit
Court of Escambia County, Florida.47 Shimek then filed a civil rights suit
in federal court in Florida. In a filing opposing a motion to dismiss, he
made the following statement:
Succinctly put, the state trial judge avoided the performance
of his sworn duty. To repeat a time worn phrase—you cannot
get justice in a state court where the judge is a product of the
prosecutorial system which aided dramatically in elevating
him to the bench. A product of that system who works close
with Sheriffs and who must depend on political support and
re-election to the bench is not going to do justice. We are
forced into this court because of the federal court’s general
attitude that state courts are available and should first be
sampled. We shouldn’t be rejected here because we tried to
follow the federal court’s general guidelines. Justice delayed
is justice denied. How much longer must Plaintiff wait?48
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
GEORGE GERSHWIN, It Ain’t Necessarily So, in PORGY AND BESS (1934).
In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995).
284 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 1973) (per curiam).
Id. at 686.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The filing of this statement in federal court led to disciplinary sanctions
against Shimek that the Florida Supreme Court affirmed.49
In re Shimek was decided in the context of legal ethics and professional
responsibility. Before examining the holding and rationale of the Florida
Supreme Court in In re Shimek, let us consider how this attack by a Florida
lawyer on a Florida judge would have played out in the general
marketplace of common law legal rights and remedies. There, the analysis
would be tempered by the constraints of the First Amendment.
If Judge Frye were to sue Shimek for defamation, Judge Frye would
face formidable common law and constitutional law obstacles. Common
law privileges would operate to shelter Shimek from liability for
statements made in judicial pleadings.50 Common law and First
Amendment doctrines would protect Shimek from liability arising from the
expression of opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, or mere epithet. They would
distinguish between libel against the judge and libel against the judicial
system and would impose on Judge Frye the burden of proving that the
allegations were false. They would also insulate Shimek absent proof of
“actual malice.”51
On the threshold question of whether the statement is legally actionable
at all, the case would turn on whether the statement that the judge “avoided
the performance of his sworn duty,”52 in the context of the entire allegedly
offending passage, could reasonably be construed as stating or implying
false statements of fact about the judge. Could these statements be
objectively verified as true or false, or were they instead subjective
critiques of the judge—that is, amorphous ideological assertions of a
judicial temperament and bias favoring prosecutors and police because of
the judge’s background as a former prosecutor and his ongoing need for
political support to get reelected?53 There is perhaps a modicum of doubt
as to how a court applying current First Amendment doctrines would
resolve these issues. The question, to be decided in the first instance by the
court as a matter of law, would be whether the passage could be reasonably
understood as either making or implying a false statement of fact. Judge
Frye’s best argument would be that the passage quoted above implies a
false and defamatory statement of fact: that Judge Frye, a former
prosecutor, was corrupt and did not decide cases on the merits but instead
bowed to the inappropriate influence of the Sherriff’s office, on whom he
49. Id. at 686–87, 690.
50. See, e.g., Long v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 285, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“Parties to litigation have an ‘absolute privilege . . . for defamatory statements made prior to, in the
institution of, or during the course of, a proceeding.’” (alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT D.
SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 8.2.1.4, at 8–14 (2004))).
51. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
52. In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d at 686 (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (requiring that
defamation actions be predicated on false statements of fact).
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depended for political support. In opposition, Shimek’s best argument
would be that the passage, considered in its entirety, is best understood as a
generalized attack on Judge Frye for being biased in favor of prosecutors
and against defendants, thereby violating his sworn duty of judicial
impartiality. While this is undoubtedly an attack on Judge Frye’s judicial
character, and in that sense certainly defamatory, the attack is not grounded
in a false statement of fact, as required for liability by both the Constitution
and the common law.54 Judges are constantly criticized, by lawyers or by
members of the press or public for various forms of bias, as “proprosecution,” “hanging judges,” “soft on criminals,” or “pro-plaintiff.”
These are expressions of opinion, not subject to the sort of objective proof
or disproof the First Amendment requires.55
Moreover, there are strains in Shimek’s statement that appear to attack
the broader regime of the Florida judiciary and the legal system itself. The
attack seems animated by Shimek’s perception that the system is tainted by
the common elevation of former prosecutors to the state bench where they
remain unfairly loyal to both their prosecutorial roots and their political
self-interest.56 This systemic attack would, under both constitutional and
common law traditions, be deemed as a form of “libel on government,”57
like attacks on the legislature, city hall, or the army and thus, deemed not
actionable.58
54. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
55. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 1 LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 6:1–6:20 (2013) (discussing
the common law opinion and fair comment doctrine in the context of defamation claims).
Statements that are “rhetorical hyperbole” or that employ language in a “loose, figurative sense” are
not actionable under orthodox First Amendment and common law principles. See, e.g., Old
Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284–85 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n
v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (stating that merely describing a public figure’s negotiating
position as “blackmail” could not be construed as actually charging the public figure with
committing a crime).
56. The court clearly saw this attack on the system as one of the offenses of Shimek’s
statement. In reShimek, 284 So. 2d at 689 (“The accused attorney’s reckless use of words condemns
and frowns upon a state judge, and there are many, who at some time in his career has been a
prosecutor.”).
57. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 291 (1964) (“For good reason, ‘no court of last
resort in this country has ever held, or even suggested, that prosecutions for libel on government
have any place in the American system of jurisprudence.’” (quoting City of Chi. v. Tribune Co., 139
N.E. 86, 88 (Ill. 1923))).
58. See, e.g., City of Phila. v. Wash. Post Co., 482 F. Supp. 897, 899 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(holding that the City of Philadelphia could not maintain an action for libel against a newspaper);
City of Albany v. Meyer, 279 P. 213, 215 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929) (holding that the City of Albany
could not maintain an action for libel against citizens); Capital Dist. Reg’l Off-Track Betting Corp.
v. Ne. Harness Horsemen’s Ass’n, 399 N.Y.S.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding that a
governmental corporation could not maintain an action for libel against a newspaper); Grafton v.
Am. Broad. Co., 435 N.E.2d 1131, 1132, 1138 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (holding that the village of
Grafton could not maintain an action for defamation against a television broadcaster); Johnson City
v. Cowles Commc’ns, Inc., 477 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tenn. 1972) (holding that Johnson City could not
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Even if a court were to hold the statement actionable, additional
constitutional and common law lines of defense designed to ensure
breathing space for expression would kick in. For example, the burden of
proof would be on Judge Frye to prove falsehood. He would bear the
burden of proving his rulings are not corruptly biased in favor of
prosecutors, but based entirely on the merits, as judged by him impartially.
But more formidably, Judge Frye, as a public official, would bear the
burden of proving, through clear and convincing evidence, that Shimek
published his statements with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
truth or falsity.59 It would not be enough that Shimek’s statements about
Judge Frye were unreasonable or published negligently. Rather, it would be
incumbent on Judge Frye to prove that Shimek harbored subjective doubts
about the truth or falsity of what he was saying about Judge Frye, but
published his statements anyway. Again, the probable outcome is that
Shimek would prevail. It appears likely that he subjectively believed what
he asserted about Judge Fyre. If so, he did not possess the constitutionally
required “actual malice.”60
In sum, though the outcome, or even the best analysis of the matter, is
not entirely free from doubt, what is absolutely clear is that First
Amendment principles protecting opinion, especially in the context of
criticism of the performance of public officials, would weigh heavily in the
analysis. They would tilt the result strongly toward insulating Shimek from
liability.
When Shimek was disciplined by the Florida Bar for violating Florida’s
ethical canons, none of these First Amendment principles came to his
rescue.61 The court interpreted the “thrust” of Shimek’s statement exactly
as this Essay suggests it should: “The thrust of the statement, when read
without explanation, leads to the conclusion that the decision of a state
judge with a prosecutorial background is tainted.”62 Rather than view this
maintain an action for libel against a magazine); Mayor, Aldermen, & Citizens of Manchester v.
Williams, [1891] 1 Q.B. 94 at 96 (holding that the City of Manchester could not maintain an action
for libel against a newspaper); see also Heyward v. Credit Union Times, 913 F. Supp. 2d 1165,
1188 (D.N.M. 2012) (“Where the group is a government entity, however, there is presumption that
the statement refers only to the government, and not to any particular individual or government
officer.”); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 919 F. Supp. 756,
766 (D.N.J. 1996) (holding that a state agency could not assert a defamation counterclaim because
governmental entities cannot maintain defamation actions against private parties for their statements
critical of government, public officials, or government services); Progress Dev. Corp. v. Mitchell,
219 F. Supp. 156, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (holding that a park district could not assert a libel
counterclaim against developers).
59. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (explaining that the First
Amendment places the burden of proving falsity on plaintiffs in defamation actions arising from
issues of public concern).
60. See In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d at 686, 688–89; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.
61. See In re Shimek, 284 So. 2d at 689.
62. Id.
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as constitutionally protected opinion, however, the court saw it as precisely
the type of statement lawyers are forbidden from making. And that
rationale was dual: to launch such an attack, the court reasoned, both
impugns the individual character of individual judges and diminishes the
larger public confidence in the legal system as an institution.63 In the
general marketplace, the Constitution protects mere insult and scorn; in the
context of lawyers attacking judges, it does not.64 If made in the general
marketplace, attacks on Florida’s institutions, even against “the entire
judiciary,”65 are legally protected by the Constitution. But in the context of
a lawyer attacking the judiciary, they are not.66 If made in the general
marketplace, attacks on an abstract ideal, such as “the chastity of the
goddess of justice”67 are constitutionally protected, but in the context of a
lawyer’s attack on that ideal, they are not.68
While the court made passing genuflections to the notion that judges
are not sacrosanct or immune from criticism for the conduct of their
office,69 these phrases were largely hollow truisms. They carried none of
the doctrinal solidity that would have applied in the general marketplace.
Invoking phrases that conjured religious devotion to the ideals of impartial
justice, the court insisted that “the administration of the judicial process as
an institution of government is a sacred proceeding.”70 The In re Shimek
court maintained it was critical that the “chastity of the goddess of justice”
be preserved.71
Judges who engage in critique of the system may also become
embroiled in disciplinary proceedings or even criminal contempt
prosecutions that raise similarly problematic First Amendment concerns.
Staying with Florida for the sake of illustrative consistency, consider
another case from the Florida Supreme Court. In In re Kelly, the court
found a trial judge guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge arising from
public statements made to the media criticizing fellow judges on matters
relating to the conduct of the court in which the judge had been elected
63. Id. (“Such ill-conceived idea, however false, tends to lessen public confidence in our legal
system.”).
64. Id. (“The far-reaching significance of the theme is to slur and insult.”).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 690.
67. Id. “It is calculated to cast a cloud of suspicion upon the entire judiciary of the State of
Florida and is totally unbecoming a member of the Bar.” Id. at 689.
68. Id. at 690.
69. Id. (“The conclusion which we here reach takes cognizance of the proposition that a judge
as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
70. Id.
71. Id. (“Admitting, therefore, the human weaknesses of judges as individuals but affirming
our belief in the essentiality of the chastity of the goddess of justice we are impelled to the
inescapable notion that any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the
administration of justice demands condemnation . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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presiding judge.72 Judges may engage in critique and advocacy for change
of the judicial system and legal principles within the system, the court
explained.73 But it is wrong to go public, particularly if the judge’s
arguments are “intemperate” or “impetuous.”74 The tensions with classic
First Amendment doctrines here are plain. Indeed, in Kelly, Chief Justice
Ervin dissented, arguing that “Judge Kelly had an untrammeled right to
publicly explain his side of the disagreement with certain of his judicial
colleagues.”75
Adding to the conceptual difficulty, a recent Third Circuit decision
illustrates that at times it may be extremely difficult to determine whether
the critical speech of a judge is inside or outside the system. In re Kendall
arose from an attempt to hold Judge Leon A. Kendall, a Superior Court of
the Virgin Islands judge, in contempt for statements he made in a written
opinion.76 The Supreme Court of the United States Virgin Islands issued a
writ of mandamus in a high-profile criminal case over which Judge
Kendall was presiding, reversing Judge Kendall’s rulings and orders.77
Judge Kendall strongly disagreed with the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands, and in a very unusual move, published an opinion first chastising
the court’s mandamus decision and then recusing himself from the case

72. In re 238 So. 2d 565, 566, 574 (Fla. 1970).
73. Id. at 569. The court explained:
There are many authorized methods of protest, dissent and criticism within the
framework of the judiciary, such as the preparation of dissenting opinions,
petitions to the Supreme Court for changes in the rules of procedure, submission
of suggested changes to various committees of the Florida Bar, participating in the
various legal seminars conducted by the Committee on Legal Education, or taking
an active part in the state and local conferences of judges.
Id.
74. Id. at 569–70. The court stated:
Criticism is not neutral. When a judge sets himself up to criticize other judges,
his criticism ultimately must be viewed as having been constructive or destructive
in its impact. If he has been temperate and judicious, his criticism is likely to be, in
its ultimate result, beneficial to the community which he serves—and it does not
matter whether this constructive criticism is publicly or privately voiced. On the
other hand, impetuous argument, or criticism taken by methods which prevent
honest discussion and a fair rebuttal can be expected only to have a destructive
result. No matter how bland or even wholesome the content, if the methods used
raise suspicion of motives among the judges, and renders the courts all suspect to
the public, the result can only be an increase in disrespect for law and order, an
increase in lawlessness, a greater tendency among some of our citizens to let loose
their tendencies to disorder.
Id.
75. Id. at 575 (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
76. In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 816 (3d Cir. 2013).
77. Id.
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due to alleged prosecutorial misconduct.78 The Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands reacted with great negativity to this seeming act of obstinate
insubordination. It cited Judge Kendall for criminal contempt, treating his
opinion as obstruction of the administration of justice.79 The court took the
view that Judge Kendall’s obstinate response to its ruling obstructed the
administration of justice.80
As the Third Circuit framed the issue, the critical question was whether
to conceptualize the actions taken by the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands as discipline of an insider or punishment of an outsider, an issue on
which there was no clear guidance from the United States Supreme
Court.81 Suggesting a divide similar to that being explored in this Essay,
78. Id. at 819–20. The court recounted Judge Kendall’s opinion:
On July 7, 2009, Kendall filed a thirty-one page opinion “for publication.” As
promised, the Ford opinion recounted the background of the criminal case,
including the events that gave rise to the writ of mandamus, and memorialized his
reasons for rejecting the plea agreement to voluntary manslaughter. But the
opinion also took two unexpected turns, both of which later became the basis for
Kendall's criminal-contempt convictions: First, the opinion offered a point-bypoint denunciation criticism of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s decision to
issue the writ of mandamus. The opinion characterized the Virgin Islands Supreme
Court’s reasoning as erroneous, “improper,” having “no rational basis,” lacking
“merit,” and “making no sense.” Indeed, the opinion went so far as to say that the
writ of mandamus “was apparently sought and issued to facilitate [Bethel’s]
blatant misconduct and perpetrate a fraud on the [Superior] Court.” Its issuance,
Kendall wrote scathingly, was therefore “contrary to law and all notions of
justice.”
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 820 n.1. The court explained:
Contempt can be either direct or indirect. Direct contempt describes “the
judge’s authority to [summarily] impose punishment, without any form of trial, on
one who engages in contumacious behavior in the judge’s presence,” such as a
party’s repeated outbursts during a hearing or a witness’s refusal to testify during
trial. Indirect contempt targets acts “committed outside the presence of the court
for which some fact-finding process is concededly necessary,” such as a person’s
refusal to obey a court order.
Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.at 820–21.
81. Id. at 821–22; see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 796 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“This case does not present the question whether a State may restrict the
speech of judges because they are judges—for example, as part of a code of judicial conduct; the
law at issue here regulates judges only when and because they are candidates.”); In re Judicial
Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1289, 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (deciding that a particular judge’s comments
were protected by the First Amendment); In re Vincent, 172 P.3d 605, 607 (N.M. 2007) (“[W]e
recognize that there are nevertheless constitutional limits on the regulation of judicial speech.”); In
re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 375 (Wash. 1998) (“A judge does not surrender First Amendment rights
upon becoming a member of the judiciary.”).
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the court distinguished between opposing principles. On one side, the
lower court embraced the First Amendment principles that constrain the
government when it is operating to discipline attorneys or judges for
expression that is substantially likely to prejudice an ongoing proceeding.
On the other side, Kendall embraced the First Amendment principles that
constrain the government when it is acting as a sovereign, invoking its
power to enforce criminal laws for expression that poses a clear and
present danger to the administration of justice.82
Deciding which of the two standards ought to apply was complex
because Judge Kendall was, after all, commenting on a pending case. At
the same time, he was clearly expressing opinions on issues already
decided in that case after he had recused himself from additional
participation in it. Thus Judge Kendall’s expression had both insider and
outsider elements. In the end, as the court saw it, it was more the remedy,
criminal contempt, than the speech that mattered:
[D]oes the government’s broader authority to discipline
attorney speech about ongoing proceedings also permit the
government to hold a judge in criminal contempt for his
speech about ongoing proceedings? We answer that question
with a resounding “No.” Criminal contempt is no mere
disciplinary tool. It derives, like all crimes, from a
government’s power as sovereign.83
Judges are government employees, and Judge Kendall’s expression
would appear to be the quintessential example of a judge’s on-the-job
speech—a judicial opinion, after all! Still, the court refused to apply the
government-employee-speech line of cases to Judge Kendall. It reasoned
that in using its criminal contempt authority, the government was not
exacting discipline against an employee, but punishing a citizen through its
criminal processes.84
82. In re Kendall, 712 F.3d at 824. The court explained:
Having concluded that a judicial opinion qualifies as “speech,” we must determine
the scope of its protection. Kendall argues that a judicial opinion is criminally
punishable only under the government’s limited authority as sovereign to regulate
speech that poses a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. By
contrast, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court relied on the government’s broader
authority to discipline attorneys for speech that is substantially likely to prejudice
ongoing proceedings and held that this broader authority allows the government to
criminally punish judicial speech that poses the same threat. We agree with
Kendall.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. Id. at 826.
84. Id. at 826 n.9 (“The Supreme Court has not yet been asked to resolve whether or how
Garcetti’s government-employer rationale extends to disciplinary restrictions on a judge’s on-thejob speech. White, 536 U.S. at 796 . . . (Kennedy, J., concurring) (‘Whether the rationale of [our
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The Third Circuit reasoned that the actions of the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands could not be properly analogized to the power of a military
commander to punish an officer’s insubordinate speech towards his
superiors.85 A court system is not like the military, the court reasoned, and
“[s]uperior courts do not depend on an instinctive obedience to command
structure that is critical to executing split-second battlefield orders.”86
Similarly, court systems do not “have a similar need to restrict the role of
dissent—unlike the military, the judicial mission depends on courts being
deliberative bodies.”87 In contrast to the Florida ruling in In re Shimek,88
the Third Circuit rejected any attempt to analogize Judge Kendall’s court
opinion to defamation, noting that he was expressing opinion, and engaged
in “rhetorical hyperbole” but not actionable false statements of fact.89
Applying general First Amendment marketplace principles to Judge
Kendall’s expression, the court held that his opinion could not be
construed as posing a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice.90
2. Self-Promotion by Judges and Lawyers
Professionalism abhors self-promotion, but the general marketplace
adores it. American judges and lawyers, at once Americans and lawyers,
are caught betwixt and between. What are they to do? When judges run for
office, may they engage in self-promotion? What if that self-promotion
includes articulation of their views or judicial persona—such as portraying
themselves as tough on crime? When lawyers advertise, do they get the
benefit of the same relatively high levels of protection for commercial
public-employee-speech cases] could be extended to allow a general speech restriction on sitting
judges—regardless of whether they are campaigning—in order to promote the efficient
administration of justice, is not an issue raised here.’) . . . .” (alterations in original)).
85. Id. at 826–27.
The People analogize the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s authority to punish
lower-court judges’ speech to the government’s broad authority . . . as military
commander to punish an officer’s insubordinate speech toward his superiors.
[This] analog[y] fall[s] flat. . . . And the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s
supervisory capacity over lower-court judges is hardly similar to the government’s
capacity as military commander. The Supreme Court has long differentiated
military-speech restrictions from those in the civilian community based on
considerations unique to the military.
Id.
86. Id. at 827.
87. Id. (citing In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890)) (“An army is not a deliberative body.
It is the executive arm. Its law is that of obedience. No question can be left open as to the right to
command in the officer, or the duty of obedience in the soldier.”).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 46–71.
89. In re Kendall, 712 F.3d at 827 n.10.
90. Id. at 829–33.
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speech enjoyed by other advertisers in the general marketplace? Or is
lawyer advertising better understood as a poor relation that receives a
second-class level of commercial speech protection that only applies to
plain-vanilla informational advertising? Applying existing case law, these
questions regarding self-promotion are far from settled.
Hostility toward self-promotion has roots in the history of the
profession that are almost primal. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
speaking at a Harvard class reunion, reflected on the best service one can
do for one’s country and one’s self. He used language that resonates deeply
with the legal profession’s proudest conceptions of professionalism: “To
see so far as one may, and to feel, the great forces that are behind every
detail . . . to hammer out as compact and solid a piece of work as one can,
to try to make it first rate, and to leave it unadvertised.”91
It was Oliver Wendell Holmes, of course, who also indelibly stamped
upon the American national psyche the image of the “marketplace of
ideas” as the core animating principle of the guarantee of freedom of
speech enshrined in the First Amendment.92 Holmes remains a
consummate study in contradiction. It is not only not surprising, but for all
of us lesser legal mortals perhaps somewhat comforting, that this towering
American legal icon had conflict embedded in his own inner psyche. He
was torn between conflicting forces: On the one hand, he had a sense of
professionalism that embraced humility; he appealed to our better angels to
hammer out the most excellent work we can but to “leave it unadvertised.”
On the other hand, he retained an abiding faith in the marketplace of ideas,
a faith that required tolerance of expression that we loath and believe
fraught with death, unless an immediate check is required to save the
country.
An American century now past Holmes, the contradiction in his
character remains a contradiction in our own. Professional distaste for the
self-promoting and self-laudatory endures. But it abides in uneasy
coexistence with the triumph of Justice Holmes’s passionate embrace of
the marketplace of ideas as the defining metaphor for American
91. G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER SELF 84
(1993).
92. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice
Holmes gives his famous proclamation:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
Id.
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conceptions of freedom of speech. Indeed, the American marketplace is all
about self-promotion. Politicians self-promote in the political marketplace,
denizens of mass culture self-promote in the cultural marketplace, and
advertisers self-promote in the marketplace of goods and services.
a. Self-Promotion by Judicial Candidates
The leading Supreme Court precedent on the speech of judicial
candidates is in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.93 Minnesota’s
canons of judicial conduct prohibited judicial office candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues.94 This
“announce clause” was quite granular, going so far as to prohibit a judicial
candidate from discussing previously decided cases if the candidate took
the view that he or she was not bound by stare decisis.95 In an opinion by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the Supreme Court struck down the Minnesota
judicial canon, applying classic “marketplace” First Amendment principles
and invoking the strict scrutiny standard.96 Pointedly, the Court rebuffed
Minnesota’s assertion that the judicial canon was justified by the state’s
interests in either preserving the actual impartiality of the state judiciary or
in preserving the appearance of impartiality.97 It was plain, the Court held,
that the judicial canon was not narrowly tailored to serve the preservation
of impartiality in its core and classic sense—that a judge is not biased for
or against either party to a proceeding.98 In contrast, the Court admitted
that the judicial canon did serve Minnesota’s interest in “impartiality” in a
more jurisprudential sense—a “lack of preconception in favor of or against
a particular legal view.”99 In a powerful ruling, the Court held that this
objective was not constitutionally permissible—and indeed was essentially
impossible in the real world.100
93. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
94. Id. at 768.
95. Id. at 772.
96. Id. at 774–76.
97. Id. at 775–76.
98. Id. at 776.
99. Id. at 777.
100. Id. (“A judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a case has
never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, and with good reason. For one thing, it
is virtually impossible to find a judge who does not have preconceptions about the law.”). The
Court refused to reach the question of whether achieving impartiality in the sense of
“openmindedness” was a compelling state interest because, as a means of pursuing this interest, the
announce clause was so “woefully underinclusive” that the Court stated it did not believe it was
adopted for that purpose. Id. at 777–80. The Court noted that the practice of prohibiting speech by
judicial candidates was neither ancient nor universal. Id. at 785. No such prohibitions existed
throughout the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries, and in modern times they
are not universal. Id. Acknowledging that there was an obvious tension between Minnesota’s
constitution, which requires judicial elections, and the announce clause, which placed most subjects
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To again draw from Florida jurisprudence, notwithstanding Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, the Florida Supreme Court in In re Kinsey
held that a candidate for a county court judgeship was properly disciplined
for statements she made during the course of her campaign; she had
portrayed herself as tough on criminals, and generally pro-prosecution and
pro-victim on matters relating to criminal justice.101 The court held that
enforcement of the discipline was warranted by Florida’s “compelling state
interest in preserving the integrity of [their] judiciary and maintaining the
public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary.”102 This was consistent with
the Florida Supreme Court’s long-held views about the importance of
maintaining public confidence in the judicial system and the rule of law:
There is no doubt that a judge in an appropriate forum may
express his protest, dissent, and criticism of the present state
of the law as long as he does not appear to substitute his
concept of what the law ought to be for what the law actually
is, and as long as he expresses himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in his integrity and impartiality
as a judge.103
b. Self-Promotion by Marketing Lawyers
Self-promotion by lawyers engaged in advertising and marketing has
caused the American legal profession no end of conflict since lawyer
advertising was first declared constitutionally protected, at least to some
degree, in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona.104 In Bates, the Supreme Court
applied the special intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to commercial
speech regulation to lawyer advertising.105 The base line for such
of interest to the voters off limits, the Court held that the First Amendment does not permit
Minnesota to leave the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing
what the elections are about. Id. at 787.
101. 842 So. 2d 77, 80–81, 92–93 (Fla. 2003).
102. Id. at 87.
103. In re Gridley, 417 So. 2d 950, 954 (Fla. 1982).
104. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
105. Id. at 379–81, 383–84 (striking down a blanket ban on lawyer advertising); see also Fla.
Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995) (sustaining a thirty-day restriction on targeted
direct-mail solicitation to accident victims); Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, 496
U.S. 91, 108–11 (1990) (striking down a disciplinary action against an attorney for listing truthful
nonmisleading information concerning certification on letterhead); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486
U.S. 466, 479–80 (1988) (striking down a blanket prohibition on targeted direct-mail solicitation);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985) (striking down a disciplinary
action against an attorney for advertising containing truthful, nondeceptive information and legal
advice); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204–07 (1982) (striking down lawyer advertising limitations
dealing with listings of areas of practice); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468
(1978) (sustaining limitations on in-person solicitation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978)
(striking down limitations on solicitation as applied to public interest groups such as the ACLU).
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regulation is the intermediate scrutiny standard often described as the
Central Hudson test—the decision that is now the governing lodestar for
commercial speech regulation.106 Under Central Hudson, the government
may regulate commercial speech when four conditions are met: (1) the
communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity; (2)
the government asserts a substantial interest to be achieved by the
regulation; (3) the restriction directly and materially advances the state
interest; and (4) the regulation is no more expansive than necessary to
advance the substantial governmental interest.107 While commercial
speech, under current doctrine, receives modestly diminished protection in
the general marketplace when compared to political, artistic, or other forms
of noncommercial speech, the protection is still quite expansive, and when
applied by the Supreme Court, especially, is often quite robust.108 The arc
of modern commercial speech jurisprudence is unmistakable: in decision
after decision, the Supreme Court has advanced protection for advertising,
repeatedly striking down regulations grounded in paternalistic motivations
or speculative judgments by government regulators.109 This is not to say
that there have not been “blips” in this progression, cases in which the
106. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
107. Id.
108. See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A
Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 793 (1993) (noting that
society protects forms of speech that, in the eyes of many, have little or no plausible social value).
109. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011) (striking down a state
law restricting the use of prescriber-identifying information in pharmaceutical marketing);
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (striking down restrictions on
pharmaceutical advertising); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 554–55, 567, 570
(2001) (striking down some restrictions on tobacco advertising and sustaining others); Greater New
Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195–96 (1999) (striking down casino
gambling advertising limitations); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996)
(striking down liquor advertisement restrictions); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491
(1995) (striking down beer advertising regulations); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 149 (1994) (striking down restrictions on accountancy advertising);
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (striking down commercial speech limitations on
accountants); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430–31 (1993) (striking
down restrictions on newsracks for commercial flyers and publications); Peel, 496 U.S. at 108–11
(holding that a regulation banning lawyer advertisement of National Board of Trial Advocacy
certification violated the Constitution); Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479–80; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 649;
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (holding that a statute banning
unsolicited mailings advertising contraceptives to aid parental authority over teaching their children
about birth control violated the Constitution); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 204–07; Cent. Hudson Gas
& Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571–72; In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 439; Bates, 433 U.S. at 383–84;
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (holding that a regulation
banning placement of “for sale” or “sold” signs on the front lawns of houses in order to prevent the
town from losing its integrated racial status violated the Constitution); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) (striking down restrictions on
pharmaceutical advertising); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828–29 (1975) (striking down
restrictions on abortion advertising).
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Court has sustained regulation of advertising.110 But the cases sustaining
restrictions on commercial speech pale in number and in force when
compared to the overwhelming body of precedent striking restrictions
down. It is especially significant that the one commercial speech decision
most hostile to the protection of advertising was entirely discredited.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico, a
case sustaining restrictions on casino advertising in Puerto Rico on a
largely paternalistic rationale,111 was effectively overruled in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.112
Advertising in the general marketplace is all about being self-promoting
and self-laudatory, often with a healthy dose of hyperbole and puffery.113
Most states, however, prohibit forms of self-promotion and comparison to
one’s competitors in the legal profession that would be common fare and
outside the pale of regulation in the general marketplace.114
A number of prominent commercial speech decisions treat the
advertising of lawyers as receiving substantially less protection than
advertising by other actors in the marketplace, invoking rationales that
would not be permissible in contexts outside the regulation of the legal
profession.115 This distrust of self-promotion is sometimes especially acute
110. See Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620 (sustaining a thirty-day ban on direct mail
solicitation by lawyers to accident victims or families); United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S.
418, 435–36 (1993) (sustaining restrictions on the broadcasting of lotteries in states that do not
permit lotteries); Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473, 485–86 (1989)
(sustaining a state university restriction on “Tupperware parties”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468
(sustaining bar restrictions on in-person solicitation).
111. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
112. 517 U.S. at 509 (“Posadas clearly erred in concluding that it was ‘up to the legislature’ to
choose suppression over a less speech-restrictive policy.”).
113. See Roy Simon, The 1999 Amendments to the Ethical Considerations in New York’s Code
of Professional Responsibility, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 265, 266–67 (2000) (“But have you ever seen
an advertisement that does not laud the lawyer? Have you ever seen a lawyer advertise by stating
that he is not such a good lawyer, but that you should call him because he needs the business?”).
114. Many states have language in their rules governing professional conduct of attorneys, for
example, that forbids advertisements that compare an attorney’s services to that of other attorneys.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2013). The American Bar Association notes
that forty-nine states, along with the District of Columbia and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, AM. BAR ASS’N., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html
(last visited June 28, 2014). The rules in several jurisdictions specifically forbid unsubstantiated
self-laudatory statements in advertisement. See IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 2
(2013); S.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 3 (2005); S.D. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
7.1(c)(3) (2004).
115. See, e.g., Hirschkop v. Va. State Bar, 604 F.2d 840, 843 (4th Cir. 1979) (“It is true that in
Bates the Court sustained the right under the First Amendment for lawyers to engage in the truthful
advertising of prices at which routine legal services will be performed. The truthfulness of such
advertising is generally susceptible to precise measurement or verification. Self-laudatory
statements, however, are not so easily verifiable, particularly by lay persons.” (citation omitted));
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when television and radio advertising is employed, on the theory that such
electronic advertising is inherently manipulative.
A Virginia case in which I was personally involved as an advocate
vividly demonstrates the tension between the First Amendment principles
applicable in the general marketplace, and the principles applied to the
self-promoting speech of lawyers. The Supreme Court of Virginia in
Hunter v. Virginia State Bar dealt with a charge of misconduct brought by
the Virginia State Bar against Virginia attorney Horace Hunter, predicated
on the content of a blog written by Hunter, entitled This Week in Richmond
Criminal Defense.116 The blog was accessible to the general public both
through a link on a website maintained by Hunter’s law firm, Hunter &
Lipton, PC, and directly through a routine Internet search, without going
through the portal of the law firm website.117 Hunter’s blog contained a
variety of content relating to legal affairs and judicial decisions.118 Some of
the blog posts contained Hunter’s commentary on national legal events,
such as the controversy surrounding former Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales and United States Attorneys’ Offices.119 Other posts described
legal decisions by state or federal courts in which Hunter was not a
participating lawyer.120 The majority of entries, however, described the
facts and outcomes of cases in which Hunter served as defense counsel for
a criminal defendant, and which resulted in a favorable outcome for the
defendant.121 The Bar took the position that Hunter’s blogs constituted
Farrin v. Thigpen, 173 F. Supp. 2d 427, 436, 445–47 (M.D.N.C. 2001) (finding that the First
Amendment did not protect television commercials allegedly intimating that a law firm was
especially aggressive in procuring settlements from insurance companies); Spencer v. Supreme
Court, 579 F. Supp. 880, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to an attorney
advertising regulation because claims “using such terms as ‘experienced,’ ‘expert,’ ‘highly
qualified,’ or ‘competent’ are difficult for a layman to confirm, measure, or verify”); In re Keller,
792 N.E.2d 865, 870 (Ind. 2003) (applying Indiana law to a similar advertising campaign as
Thigpen, and reaching the same result); Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Humphrey, 377
N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1985) (“We continue to believe the ‘special problems’ recognized by the
United States Supreme Court exist in the field of electronic advertising. These problems warrant a
special rule to regulate lawyer advertising in the electronic media.”); In re PRB Docket No.
2002.093, 868 A.2d 709, 712 (Vt. 2005) (“Direct claims of expertise that are not truthful and
factually verifiable, however, may be prohibited or restricted as unduly misleading.”).
116. Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d. 611, 613 (Va. 2013), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871
(2013). Editor’s note: The author of this Essay, Rodney A. Smolla, served as lead counsel, writing
the briefs and presenting the oral arguments, for Mr. Hunter in this matter.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Opening Brief of Appellant at 1–2, Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 744 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2013)
(No. 121472).
120. Id.
121. Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 613. Thirty unique blog posts were at issue. Five of those thirty
posts discussed legal and policy issues other than judicial cases. Twenty-five of the posts discussed
cases. Hunter represented clients in twenty-two of those cases. One of these posts described a
wrongful death case in which Hunter represented one of the parties. The remaining twenty-one
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advertising and was misleading.122 Hunter maintained that his blogs were
political speech and were entirely accurate descriptions of what transpired
in public judicial proceedings, sprinkled with his own commentary and
views. Hunter also admitted that one of his motivations was selfpromotion.123
The blog, he conceded, was a way of projecting a
professional identity as a criminal defense lawyer, noting that
“people want to know that you’re more than just trying to sell
them services. They want to know who you are and what you
stand for.” Yet Hunter insisted in his testimony that he did not
regard the blogs as “advertising” or as “soliciting business” in
the normal sense of the term. To the contrary, his purpose was
also political and ideological. He used the blog to offer broad
critiques of the justice system, to comment on the specific
facts and outcomes of cases (including many in which he
participated as a lawyer and some in which he did not), and to
generally advance a point-of-view that was edged toward the
values held by many criminal defense lawyers, such as the
principle that persons are presumed innocent until proven
guilty, and notions that not all criminal defendants are guilty,
and not all are convicted—acquittals do happen. In Mr.
Hunter’s words:
[I]t’s intended to combat in large part the public
perceptions that is clearly on the side that people
are guilty until they’re proven innocent. There are
shows out there like Nancy Grace and other things
that you see and writings all the time, particularly
on the Internet; soon as somebody’s arrested,
okay, they’re automatically guilty. And one of the
things we do is try to combat that public
perception. Even when we’re talking about cases
that I’ve dealt with personally, generally there’s a
comment at the end of the article that says
something to the effect of, this case again
demonstrates that just because somebody is
charged doesn’t mean they’re guilty. Or what this
case represents is the fact that this should have
never been a crime in the first place. . .

described criminal cases in which Hunter’s clients were either found not guilty, plea bargained to an
agreed upon disposition, or received reduced charges or dismissal. Id. at 614.
122. Id.
123. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–9, Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013)
(No. 12-1379).
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When asked to elaborate on why he so steadfastly refused
to acquiesce in the Bar’s insistence that his blogs be labeled
advertising, he stated that this would cheapen his message,
turning material that he regarded as political and legal
commentary into something that was entirely mercenary and
profit-driven:
It cheapens the speech when I have to put in front
of that, oh, by the way, this is for advertising
purposes only. This isn’t—you know, and it just
takes some of the articles out of context. And I
offered a disclaimer that I thought was appropriate
based on what it is I was doing.124
Hunter lost in the Supreme Court of Virginia, by a 5–2 vote.125 While the
content of Hunter’s speech may have been entirely political, his motivation
was at least partly self-promoting and commercial, and this was enough to
convince the Virginia court that his speech was misleading advertising,
unless proper disclaimers were affixed to it.126
Justice Donald Lemons, joined by Justice Elizabeth McClanahan,
dissented.127 The dissent resisted the majority’s willingness to draw a
distinction between the blogs that described Hunter’s own cases, and those
that did not, as though the posts involving Hunter’s own prior cases were
not also laden with political content.128 Justice Lemons thus observed:
Hunter’s blog contains articles about legal and policy
issues in the news, as well as detailed descriptions of criminal
trials, the majority of which are cases where Hunter was the
defense attorney. The articles also contain Hunter’s
commentary and critique of the criminal justice system. He
uses the case descriptions to illustrate his views.129
In reasoning that Hunter’s discussion of his own prior cases constituted
political speech, the dissenters stated that “[a]s political speech, Hunter
uses his blog to give detailed descriptions of how criminal trials in Virginia
are conducted. He notes how the acquittal of some of his clients has

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 8–10.
Hunter, 744 S.E.2d at 621.
Id. at 620–21.
Id. at 621 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
Id. at 622.
Id.
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exposed flaws in the criminal justice system.”130 The United States
Supreme Court, however, denied review.131
CONCLUSION
I have worked as an advocate and a scholar on many of the issues
explored in this Article. The exploration I have undertaken here is not
intended to relitigate lost causes like that of Horace Hunter in a law review
essay. Nor is it intended to definitively resolve the tensions regarding the
speech of judges and lawyers that so plainly remain at large in the legal
profession and in First Amendment doctrine.
I find myself torn, as I am sure many of my colleagues in the profession
are torn, between idealism and realism. As a proud lawyer admitted to the
Illinois and Virginia bars, and as a legal educator who has been a professor
and dean, I hold the noblest values of the profession dear. I cherish the
eternal quest for justice, the promotion of respect for the rule of law, the
preservation of public confidence in the legal system (including judicial
impartiality), the maintenance of professionalism, and the safeguarding of
the dignity of the profession. These are values I seek to imbue in law
students and promote among my professional colleagues.
For the reasons suggested in this Essay, I believe that these values do
exert an important gravitational pull on First Amendment doctrine. I
believe they are important in shaping the contours of what I believe is
legitimately regarded as a “carve out” from the general marketplace. This
carve out appropriately empowers bar regulators to restrict the speech of
judges and lawyers in a manner that would not be permissible regulation of
the citizenry in the general marketplace.
First Amendment doctrine, however, like the traditions of selfregulation within the legal profession itself, must often strike a balance
among competing values. I remain convinced that in striking that balance,
the legal profession has at times partaken of too much American idealism
and not enough American legal realism. The Supreme Court’s opinions in
landmark cases such as Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and
130. Id. The dissenting justices remarked:
The majority does not give sufficient credit to the fact that Hunter uses the
outcome of his cases to illustrate his views of the system. Hunter testified that one
of the reasons he maintained the blog was to combat “the public perception that is
clearly on the side that people are guilty until they’re proven innocent.” For
example, when discussing one of the cases where his client was found not guilty,
he concludes the post by explaining that this case is an “example of how innocent
people are often accused of committing some of the most serious crimes. That is
why it is important not to judge the guilt of an individual until all the evidence has
been presented both for and against him.”
Id.
131. Hunter v. Va. State Bar, 133 S. Ct. 2871, 2871 (2013) (denying cert. petition).
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Arizona State Bar v. Bates were wake-up calls to realism. Professionalism
is one thing, paternalism another. The American public is able to handle
more critique and self-promotion than we sometimes give it credit for.
The great lawyer and Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes, well understood
these tensions, but in the end, when it came to making hard law, and not
just making speeches, he sided with the values of the First Amendment
marketplace. A limited carve out from that marketplace, restricting the
speech of judges and lawyers to advance palpable and functional interests
necessary to the integrity of the legal system is justified. We should,
though, leave the advancement of our more idealistic values, values that I
deeply embrace, to education and peer pressure toward professionalism,
and avoid the serious tensions with First Amendment doctrine that occur
when we attempt to ossify those values into hard law.
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